Lessons · Cybersecurity · credential stuffing and reused passwords
Credential stuffing: why one reused password is everybody's problem
When a password leaks from one site, attackers try the same email and password on every other site, automatically, and it works because people reuse them.
Hone is a place to practise a career, one idea a day. This is one of its lessons, written out in full and free to read without an account.
What it is for
The webmail log shows 40,000 login attempts in an hour from thousands of addresses, each trying one account once. Nobody guessed anything. They are replaying a list from somebody else's breach, and the accounts that fall are the ones whose owners reused a password.
How to think about it
Recognise the pattern: many sources, roughly one attempt each, a very low success rate, and the successes sitting on old accounts. The answer is not a stronger password; it is a different one per site, MFA, and checking new passwords against known-leaked lists.
Worked example
Log: 40,000 attempts, 3,100 source addresses, one try eachNot a brute force from one place. A list being replayed.
Successes: 212 logins, all on accounts unchanged for yearsThe reused passwords. This is what leaked somewhere else.
Rate: 212 / 40,000 = 0.53 per centLow, and still 212 accounts. Volume does the work.
Control: reset those 212, turn on MFA, one password per siteThe stolen password becomes useless with a second factor.
Your turn
Write the habit that makes credential stuffing work at all.
the habit: password
Solve one, graded on the server
The trap
Blaming password strength. A twenty-character password reused on a breached forum is a twenty-character key to your bank.